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Abstract 
We assess the bene€ts of a potential European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS) using 
a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model with labour market frictions. Our calibration 
provides a novel diagnosis of the European labour markets, revealing the key parameters – in 
particular, job-separation and job-finding rates – that explain their different performance in terms 
of unemployment (or employment) and its persistence. We show that there are only small welfare 
gains from insuring against country-specific cyclical fluctuations in unemployment expenditures. 
However, we find that there are substantial gains from reforming currently suboptimal 
unemployment benefit systems. In spite of country differences, it is possible to unanimously agree 
on an EUIS with unlimited duration of eligibility, which eliminates the risk of not finding a job before 
the receipt of benefits ends, and a low replacement rate of 15%, which stabilizes incentives to 
work and save. We argue that such reforms are more effectively designed at the European level 
than at the national level because national governments do not take into account general 
equilibrium effects of their reforms on citizens in other countries. Concerns regarding the political 
feasibility of such a system are addressed through country-specific contribution payments that 
eliminate cross-country transfers. The resulting tax differences across countries may be the best 
statistic of their structural labour market differences, in terms of job creation and destruction, 
providing clear incentives for reform. 
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1 Introduction
e recent nancial and sovereign debt crises have aected European labour markets
asymmetrically both in terms of duration and severity of unemployment. In particular,
stressed countries - such as Greece, Portugal and Spain - have experienced high levels of
unemployment, making it very dicult, if not impossible, to provide adequate insurance
for the unemployed and, at the same time, to satisfy the low-decit (Fiscal Compact)
commitments. is has raised interest in proposals for Europe-wide, or Euro-Area-wide,
Unemployment Insurance schemes.1
Given the asymmetries and lack of perfect coordination of real business cycles across
European countries,2 a European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS) can eciently
provide risk-sharing across national labour markets and, at the same time, reduce the
countercyclical impact of unemployment expenditures on national budgets. Further-
more, it can provide three additional important benets for the participant states. First,
it can reduce the lasting recessionary eects which follow severe crisis, as it has hap-
pened in the euro crisis and recession; second, it can develop a much needed solidar-
ity across national labour markets and, third, it can improve labour mobility and mar-
ket integrations, since unemployment benets, and the corresponding active policies of
surveillance, do not need to be tied to a specic location.
However, the same asymmetries show that implementing a European Unemploy-
ment Insurance scheme may not be easy - or politically feasible - if it implies large and
‘persistent transfers’ across countries. In fact, these ‘persistent transfers’ are a good in-
dicator of pending structural reforms; therefore, it is not just an issue of redistribution,
it can also be a moral hazard problem: ‘persistent transfers’ may further delay costly,
but needed, reforms.
erefore, to assess the need, viability and possible design of an EUIS one needs to
take into account its potential eects: on individual agents’ employment and savings
decisions; on the aggregate distribution of employment, unemployment and inactivity;
1In this paper we abstract from specic legal and institutional requirements; we will therefore refer to
a European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS) in reference to any possible transnational scheme
that addresses the type of diversities which are present in the EU.
2For an overview on business cycles in the Euro Area see, for example, Bo¨wer and Catherine (2006),
Giannone et al. (2009) and Saiki and Kim (2014).
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on national budgets, in particular taxes to nance unemployment benets; on insurance
transfers across countries; on aggregate savings and investment and, ultimately, on so-
cial welfare. In other words, one needs to address these interrelated eects in order to
answer a basic question: which unemployment risks need and should – and, if so, how
they should – be shared across European countries?
is is a conceptual question that requires a quantitative answer. Unfortunately, with
the exception of the works of Dolls et al. (2015) and Beblavy and Maselli (2014), there
is very lile quantitative evaluation of European Unemployment Insurance schemes.
In particular, there is no modelling framework to analyse the key trade-os of such
schemes. In this paper we develop and calibrate – to European countries – a dynamic
model to study these eects and provide a set of policy experiments and an imple-
mentable proposal.
Figure 1: Average European Unemployment Rates: 2001-2014
Any model requires an adequate level of abstraction, in our case we need to eec-
tively compare labour markets and unemployment policies of dierent countries. Re-
garding labour markets, Figure 1 ranks European countries using Eurostat data on aver-
age unemployment rates (and their variability) for dierent European countries (2001-
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2014). is is informative of the ‘European labour market diversity’ but it is too partial
and crude an approximation to build a model just based on these statistics. Alterna-
tively, a very detailed description of countries’ labour markets and unemployment poli-
cies can be very informative but dilutes the main tradeos that should be at the core
of a dynamic equilibrium model. Our approach is to study worker ows across the
three states of employment, unemployment and inactivity. e corresponding transi-
tion matrices, and associated steady-state distributions, are the pictures that describe
our dierent economies. For example, using Eurostat quarterly data on worker ows
(2010Q2-2015Q4), Figure 2 shows similarities and dierences in terms of ‘persistency
ows’: Employment to Employment (“E to E”, denoted E-E) versus Unemployment to
Unemployment (“U to U”, denoted U-U). With the exception of three countries (Spain,
Portugal and Slovenia), these ‘persistency ows’ show a strong correlation among Euro-
pean labour markets, with more important dierences on U-U. e corresponding rank-
ing, across this E-E vs. U-U axis (of all but three countries), is not the same as the ranking
of unemployment rates of Figure 1. In steady-state, the transition matrix of ows for a
given country denes its stationary distribution of employment, and the corresponding
Figures 1 and 2 are just two snapshots of European labour markets. Behind the scaered
plots lie possible dierences in preferences, technologies and market institutions, and
labour policies. We will assume that across EU countries citizens share (almost) the same
preferences and that labour mobility is relatively low across countries (we assume it is
nil) but that EU countries still dier in the other aspects – mainly, market institutions
and labour policies.
We build on the work of Krusell et al. (2011) and Krusell et al. (2015), who cali-
brate the U.S. three-states ows with a dynamic general equilibrium model with labour
market frictions, to analyse the diverse European labour markets. As in their calibra-
tion analysis, we generate worker-ows transition matrices and distributions across the
three states as the outcome of a dynamic general equilibrium. is requires us to set a
few parameters on preferences and technology, and calibrate others to match ows and
stocks, consistently with observed time series and the existing unemployment policies
of a country. More specically, our model economies are characterised by three sets
of parameters: (i) generic parameters of preferences and technologies common to all
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Figure 2: Persistence of Employment and Unemployment
economies – agents’ discount factors, idiosyncratic productivity shock, etc.; (ii) country-
specic structural parameters of their economies - for example, the job-separation and
job-nding rates, which in turn are a summary of dierent factors determining job cre-
ation, destruction and matching, and (iii) the country-specic unemployment insurance
policies, summarized in two – plus one – parameters; the two are the replacement ra-
tio (unemployment benets to wages) and the duration of unemployment benets; the
third is the unemployment payroll tax rate needed to balance the budget within a period.
Section 3 describes our model.
Our calibration is a contribution in itself: it provides a novel diagnosis of the Eu-
ropean labour markets, since it reveals the key parameters that explain their dierent
performance – in terms of unemployment (or employment) and its persistence. Country-
specic structural parameters – in particular, job-separation and job-nding rates – and
not UI policy parameters, are the key parameters. Not surprisingly, the job-nding rates
for unemployed and for inactive are aligned, but their ranking, while very signicant to
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explain persistence, provides a partial picture of labour market performance: one needs
to account for the job-separation rate – for example, the very high job-separation rate of
Spain – to get a more accurate one. In contrast, the ‘technological’ dimension in which
we allow countries to dier – the total factor productivity – is not a key parameter to
account for labour market dierences, it mostly accounts for average wage dierences.
e fact that dierences in UI policy parameters do not correspond to dierences in
labour market performance does not mean they are not relevant: they are, for two re-
lated reasons. First, because they show interesting paerns: for example, countries with
high unemployment rates –say, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Slovakia – have low re-
placement rates but, among them, only those with high job-separation rates have long
average duration of unemployment benets (Spain and Portugal), while long average
duration of unemployment benets and high job-separation rates are also characteris-
tic of countries with low unemployment rates (Denmark and Finland). Second, they
are relevant because dierent UI policies – and/or dierent distributions of employment
– result in dierent payroll taxes, since in our calibration all national budgets balance.
ese tax dierences also determine the desirability of UI policy changes, at the national
or at the EU – or some other – level. It should be noted that our UI policy parameters are
related, but not on a one-to-one basis, with reported replacement and duration rates. We
account for the reported eligibility rates, but then we let the reported benets and the
existing unemployment rates and ows determine our calibrated UI parameters. Section
4 provides a more detailed description of our calibration procedures and results.
Our model and its calibration provide the framework for our policy experiments,
the main goal and contribution of this paper. Perhaps the most frequently used argu-
ment in favor of an EUIS is that it may provide insurance against country specic large
uctuations in unemployment, which with limited scal capacity result in uctuations
in the tax burden associated with its nancing. Our rst experiment therefore targets
a quantitative evaluation of the potential pure risk sharing benets of an EUIS when
one country suers a severe negative shock. To this end, we compute the labour mar-
ket and welfare consequences of a deep recession in two alternative scenarios: (i) the
government is in nancial autarky and needs to raise taxes on the employed in order
to maintain a balanced UB budget; (ii) the country is insured against increased unem-
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ployment and can go through the recession without raising taxes. Otherwise, we assume
that the unemployment insurance system remains the same in all remaining countries in
both cases. We nd that the risk sharing benets resulting from the welfare dierences
of the second scenario with respect to the rst one are small, and marginally higher for
the employed, whose taxes are smoother, than for the unemployed, whose benets have
not changed. is experiment implies that although insurance benets exist, their small
size, questions the rationale for a EUIS as a “rainy day fund”, unless it rains very oen.
In light of this result, one may doubt the desirability of a European unemployment
insurance system. Even more so as the observed heterogeneity in labour market insti-
tutions suggests that the optimal benet systems could dier substantially across Euro-
pean countries, making it dicult for governments to reach a common ground. To eval-
uate this claim, we compute the optimal unilateral reform of the unemployment benet
system (nanced at the national level), separately for each country. We perform this ex-
ercise in partial equilibrium assuming that a single country does not aect equilibrium
prices. We nd that the optimal mix of replacement rate, and duration of unemployment
benets, is surprisingly similar across the countries studied. In all countries it is optimal
to provide an unlimited duration of eligibility and the optimal replacement rates vary
between 20% and 45%.
Despite similar optimal national unemployment insurance policies one may still ar-
gue that the small dierence suce to let countries reform their systems by themselves
rather than to force them into a common European benet scheme. We show that this
argument is awed because individual national governments do not internalize general
equilibrium eects of their reforms on citizens in other European countries. In partic-
ular, we show that if all European countries would reform their system simultaneously
and the capital market is required to clear at the union level, i.e. in general equilibrium,
the very same UI benet systems that seem optimal in partial equilibrium, are in fact
welfare reducing in most of the countries. If national governments are benevolent but
only towards the citizens of their own country, they would reform the benet system to-
wards a more generous one than what is optimal from a collective European perspective.
Increasing the generosity of the UI benet system in some European countries, reduces
private savings and hence the aggregate, European, capital stock. As a consequence the
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marginal product of labour declines everywhere. is redistributes from poor agents,
who derive most of their income from wages to rich agents with mainly capital income.
Importantly, the common European capital market implies that this redistribution hap-
pens across all Europe.
e nal contribution is to provide a beer alternative: a common European Unem-
ployment Insurance System (EUIS). We rst show that a fully harmonized system which
is jointly nanced at the European level is unlikely to achieve unanimous support across
member states as it would result in transfers from countries with structurally low un-
employment to high unemployment countries. Interestingly, for some of the net payers,
the welfare gains of such a reform are positive, suggesting that in these countries the
current unemployment benet systems are far from optimal. We then neutralize trans-
fers through varying contribution payments across countries. We nd that an EUIS with
an unlimited duration and a replacement rate of 15% is welfare improving in all coun-
tries and almost unanimous. e unlimited duration insures agents against the risk of
losing eligibility before the receipt of unemployment benets ends. At the same time
the low replacement rate stabilizes incentives to work and save, keeping the European
capital stock and therefore wages high. A positive side eect of such a system with tax
dierences that eliminate cross-country transfers is that these dierences may serve as
an incentive device for individual countries to structurally reform weak labour market
institutions.
Implementation
Although it is not the focus of this paper, it is worth to briey consider how this EUIS
proposal could be implemented. e basic idea is that it can be implemented through
the existing national Unemployment Insurance Systems, it is for this reason we have
only considered the common form of unemployment benets dened by their ‘replace-
ment and duration’. If the national funds had enough borrowing capacity, to provide
the unemployment benets without increasing the taxes in times of crisis, and enough
commitment, to properly accumulate funds in normal and good times, the EUIS would
only require policy commitment and coordination. However, not all (if any) existing na-
tional systems satisfy these requirements, in which case a mixed solution between the
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national UI funds and a central EU fund is in order.
e EUIS central fund can be hosted in the European Stability Fund3 which would
have contracts with participating countries stipulating (unemployment) countercyclical
transfer between the national fund and the central fund as to guarantee the uniform
unemployment benets preserving smooth taxes within the limited borrowing capacity
of the national fund. In other words, as with other ESF contracts, rst there must be
a country-risk assessment (an improved version of our calibration) to assess the coun-
try referential stable payroll tax rate and unemployment rate, as well as the thresholds
unemployment rates determining country transfers to and from the central fund. e
contract should be designed, as other ESF contracts, to guarantee that these transfers do
not become permanent transfers. In fact, a stable system of payroll taxes and benets
results in uctuating net revenues at the country level when, in additional to agents’
idiosyncratic risk, there is also country risk (as in our rst experiment in Section 5).
e mixed design of the EUIS means that the central fund absorbs these uctua-
tions beyond certain limits (given by unemployment rate thresholds), acting as a safe
deposit when unemployment is relatively low and providing insurance when it is rela-
tively high. Our reported structural dierences across countries imply that constrained
ecient contracts between participating countries and the fund should be country spe-
cic, but based on the same common principles. On a periodic basis – say, every seven
years – the country risk assessment should be updated and the referential rates adapted
accordingly, to make sure that transfers full their stabilisation role without becoming
persistent inows or outows, to or from the fund.
e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. e next section briey discusses
the current literature on the topic. In section 3 we present the model and in section 4
our calibration, which provides the basis for our policy experiments in section 5. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
3See the ESF ADEMU proposal in Marimon and Cooley (2018, Chs. 2 and 12), based on A´braha´m et al.
(2018) characterization of ESF constrained ecient contracts.
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2 Literature Review
ere are a few recent papers that also study dierent aspects of the design of a EUIS
coming both from academic scholars and from policy institutions. In this section, we
review briey some of the most recent and relevant papers on this issue.
On the hand, Ignaszak et al. (2018) study the optimal provision of unemployment
insurance in a federal state containing atomistic (and symmetric) regions. e focus of
their paper is dierent from ours in three important dimensions. First, in their environ-
ment, the regions are ex ante identical, hence they cannot study the asymmetric eect
of a EUIS on the dierent participating nations as we do. At the same time, their model
allows for a rich interaction between federal and local policies as regional governments
have a wide set of instruments, that they can use to respond to the introduction of new
federal policies. eir main focus is indeed to study the crowding out of regional incen-
tives due to generous federal insurance schemes (moral hazard). e third dierence is
that their model does not allow for an intertemporal saving technology for any agents
(households, regions or the union altogether). Our results show that general equilibrium
eects of dierent unemployment insurance policies through the savings channel can
be quantitatively very important.
On the other hand, Claveres and Clemens (2017) and Moyen et al. (2016)study un-
employment insurance and international risk sharing in a two-region DSGE model with
frictional labour markets and calibrate their model to the core and the periphery of the
Euro-zone. In both papers, a supranational agency runs an unemployment insurance
scheme that triggers transfers to recessionary countries but has zero transfers in expec-
tation. Such a scheme allows recessionary countries to maintain unemployment benets
and simultaneously reduce taxes, thus dampening recessionary eects. Our model dif-
fers in many dimensions from these papers. First, our model features a higher degree
of heterogeneity both across and within countries. In particular, our policy experiments
are performed with ten countries of the Euro area instead of two regions. As we show,
labour market institutions and consequently ows across employment, unemployment
and inactivity are as heterogeneous across countries within the core (and the periphery)
as across the core and the periphery. For example, we found that certain implemen-
10
tations of an EUIS have signicantly dierent eects on Belgium and Germany, two
core countries. In addition, the combination of endogenous savings decisions and id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks result in a non-degenerate distribution of wealth in our
model. We show that this within country wealth heterogeneity is a key determinant
for both the welfare eects of UI policies and for determining the general equilibrium
channel of policies through precautionary savings. Finally, our paper provides an ex-
tensive welfare evaluation (across countries, employments states and wealth levels) of
dierent EUIS implementations both with business cycle uctuations and by studying
the transition to a new steady states aer a policy reform.
In contrast with the previous papers, Dolls et al. (2015) and Beblavy and Lenaerts
(2017) take into account the rich heterogeneity within the Euro area. ey provide
quantitative exercises that measure the possibilities for intertemporal and interregional
smoothing of unemployment benets and social security contributions under dierent
versions of a EUIS. Both papers present a set of counterfactual scenarios where house-
hold income and the evolution of labour markets are kept xed during the period of
study, and dierent specications of a EUIS are considered. As in our paper, both stud-
ies nd considerable interregional and intertemporal smoothing possibilities. In con-
trast with our paper, the lack of individual responses does not allow them to evaluate
the eects of dierent insurance systems on labour markets, household consumption,
individual savings and welfare. In addition, this implies that there are no equilibrium
adjustments either and no eect on aggregate savings and capital accumulation.
Finally, Dullien et al. () provide a concrete proposal to be discussed at the European
Parliament following a similar approach as the two papers above. In contrast with our
work, they only focus on the fund-contract aspect, applying the self-insurance and the
reinsurance principles to the design of a EUIS which operates national funds and a joint
‘stormy day fund’ that is operational only when the country is hit by a severe crisis. Sim-
ilarly to ours, their scheme is intended to be implemented on a voluntary basis and it
has interesting countercyclical features, which can improve upon the current situation.
However, the national contracts are not based on a country-specic risk-assessment,
the nal destination of the funds is not guaranteed and similarly the above papers the
methodology does not allow to evaluate the impact on individual decisions and on equi-
11
librium outcomes.
3 Model
Our model economy consists of a union of I ∈ N countries. We assume that the popula-
tion in each country i ∈ {1, ..., I} is xed and that there is no migration across countries.
is implies that labor markets clear country by country. Capital, on the other hand, is
perfectly mobile across countries. We assume that the union as a whole is a closed econ-
omy such that the (weighted) sum of the capital stocks in all countries equals the savings
of all citizens in the union.
Each country is modeled along the lines of Krusell et al. (2011) and Krusell et al.
(2015). eir model captures key economic decisions of agents regarding their labour
market behaviour and is therefore suited to think about unemployment policy. In par-
ticular, in the model, given labour income taxes and unemployment benets, agents
with an opportunity to work are able to choose whether or not they work and agents
currently not employed are able to choose whether or not to actively search for a job.
Timing and Preferences. Time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} is discrete. Each country is popu-
lated by a continuum of agents of measure ni, where
∑N
i=1 n
i = 1. Preferences over
consumption, labour supply and job search are given by
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(ct)− αwt − γist
]
. (1)
Agents derive utility from consumption ct and disutility from employment wt and job
search st. e parameter α captures the disutility of work and is assumed to be the
same in each country. e parameter γi denotes the disutility of active job search and is
varying across countries. In this way we capture that the governments’ assistance in the
search for a job diers across countries. e time discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) is the same
for all citizens in the union. Workers can only choose to supply labor on the extensive
margin, i.e. wt ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally, the search decision is also discrete: st ∈ {0, 1}.
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Markets and Technology. e production sector is competitive. Firms, who produce
according to a constant returns to scale technology, hire labour from the domestic labour
market and pay a wage per eciency unit of labour that equals the marginal product of
labour. ey rent capital from the international capital market at a price rt and pay for
the depreciation of capital; the total rental price equals the marginal product of capital,
which is the same across countries. Workers supply labour in the domestic market.
is market is characterized by frictions that aect workers’ separations from jobs, and
workers’ access to a job opportunity. In what follows, these frictions are described in
detail.
In the beginning of every period, agents who were employed in the previous period
can loose their job with probability σi. e probability of nding a job while not em-
ployed depends on the search eort. An agent who is actively searching during period t
nds an employment opportunity for period t+ 1 with probability λiu; an agent who is
not actively searching, with probability λin < λiu. Aer loosing a job, agents who search
may be eligible for unemployment benets. e process that determines eligibility for
unemployment benets is described below. Note that the job arrival rates and the job
separation rate are country specic. In this way we capture the heterogeneity in labour
market institutions across Europe.
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their labour productivity, denoted by zt ∈
Z = {z¯1, z¯2, ..., z¯nz}. Idiosyncratic productivity follows a rst order Markov chain with
transition probabilities p(z′|z). is process is assumed to be the same in each country.
Agents cannot directly insure themselves against the idiosyncratic productivity risk,
however they can save using a risk-free bond. e risk-free return is given by the inter-
national real interest rate rt.
Production is given by the Cobb-Douglas technology:
F i(Kit , L
i
t) = A
i
t(K
i
t)
θ(Lit)
1−θ, (2)
whereAit denotes total factor productivity in country i,Kit the aggregate capital stock in
country i and θ the capital share of output. Lit is aggregate labour in country i, measured
in eciency units. In what follows, we generally assume no aggregate (country-specic)
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shocks, i.e. Ait = Ai.4
Individual Labour Market States. An agent can be employed, unemployed or inac-
tive. e dierence between unemployed and inactive agents is that the former exert
search eort while the laer do not. Further, if an agent is unemployed he can either be
eligible for unemployment benets, in which case he receives a certain fraction of his
potential income as a wage worker or he can be non-eligible, in which case he does not
receive benets and hence solely lives from his savings. is gives a total of four possible
individual labor market states that an agent can aain, xt ∈ {e, ue, un, n}: employed,
unemployed eligible, unemployed non-eligible, non-participating;
Unemployment Benets. Eligibility for unemployment benets is partially deter-
mined by agent’s endogenous decisions, partially by exogenous shocks. Only agents
who are exogenously separated from their job are eligible for unemployment benets,
while agents who quit their job themselves are not eligible. Further, in order to maintain
eligibility agents have to continuously exert search eort. Once an agent stops search-
ing, she is non-eligible even if at some later time she starts searching again. Finally, in
every period with some probability µi agents loose eligibility even if they search for a
job. is is a parsimonious way to capture limited (and country-specic) duration of
unemployment benet receipt.5 Non-eligibility is an absorbing state. e only way to
regain eligibility is to nd a job, be employed for some time and then be exogenously
separated again.
An eligible unemployed agent in country i receives unemployment benets bit(zt)
according to
bit(zt) = b¯
i
tω
i
tzt (3)
where b¯it is the replacement rate in country i, ωit is the wage per eciency unit of labour
and zt is the agent’s current productivity level. e formula in (3) implies that an agent
receives unemployment benets according to his current labor market productivity. A
4We deviate from this assumption only in subsection 5.1.
5In reality this duration is not stochastic but xed. However, implementing a xed duration is com-
putationally expensive as it requires to keep track of the periods that each unemployed agent already
receives benets. To economize on the state space we hence use this stochastic process as in Krusell et al.
(2011) and Krusell et al. (2015).
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more realistic assumption would be to have unemployment benets depend on past
labour earnings. We choose (3) to economize in the dimension of the state space of the
model (avoiding the need to keep track of past productivity of currently unemployed
agents), and because the process zt is persistent, implying that current productivity is a
good proxy for previous labor earnings.
Budget Sets. In every period t, each agent in country i chooses a pair of consumption
and savings from a budget setBit(a, z, x) that depends on his current assets, productivity
and employment state as well as on current prices rt and ωit. e budget set of an agent
who is employed in period t (xt = e) is given by
Bit(a, z, e) =
{
(c, a′) ∈ R2+ : c+ a′ ≥ (1 + rt)a+ (1− τ it )ωitz
}
. (4)
An employed agent nances consumption c and savings a′ with current period’s asset
a inclusive of interest income rta and income from work, net of the tax rate τ it . An
unemployed agent who is eligible for unemployment benets faces the budget set
Bit(a, z, u
e) =
{
(c, a′) ∈ R2+ : c+ a′ ≥ (1 + rt)a+ bit(z)
}
. (5)
He does not have wage income but receives some fraction of his potential income as
unemployment benets.
Finally, both unemployed non-eligible and non-active agents nance consumption
and next period’s assets exclusively from savings:
Bit(a, z, u
n) = Bit(a, z, n) =
{
(c, a′) ∈ R2+ : c+ a′ ≥ (1 + rt)a
}
. (6)
Labor Market Decisions and Value Functions. e individual optimization prob-
lem has a recursive representation. Denote the value of an individual in country i, period
t, and state (a, z, x), by V it (a, z, x). e time index of the value function captures in a
simple way that the current value depends on current and future prices and government
policies, which both vary over time. en the value of an agent in employment is given
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by
V it (a, z, e) = max
(c,a′)∈Bit(a,z,e)
{
log (c)− α + β
∑
z′∈Z
p(z′|z)
[
(1− σi) max
x′∈{e,un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
+σi
(
λiu max
x′∈{e,ue,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′) + (1− λiu) max
x′∈{ue,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
)]}
.
(7)
e Bellman equation reects the dynamics of the labour market. In the present
period the worker derives utility from consumption but disutility of work. e continu-
ation value takes into account that with probability 1−σi the agent will not be separated
from the job. In this case he can choose between staying employed or to quit the job.
In the laer case he can choose to stay inactive or to search for a new job. He will,
however, not be eligible for benets as he decided to leave the rm himself. Hence, if
the worker does not get separated from his job he has three choices, x′ ∈ {e, un, n}.
With probability σi the worker is separated from his job. en with probability λiu he
immediately gets matched with a new rm, in which case he again can choose between
employment, unemployment and inactivity. If he chooses unemployment he is eligible
for benets since he was exogenously separated from the job. With probability 1 − λiu
he does not immediately nd a new job. In this case he can only choose between eligible
unemployment and inactivity, i.e. x′ ∈ {ue, n}. Note that a worker who was separated
from his job will get unemployment benets for one period with certainty as long as he
searches for a new job during this period.
Similarly, the value of an eligible unemployed agent in country i satises:
V it (a, z, u
e) = max
(c,a′)∈Bit(a,z,ue)
{
log (c)− γi+
β
∑
z′∈Z
p(z′|z)
[
λiu
(
(1− µi) max
x′∈{e,ue,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′) + µi max
x′∈{e,un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
)
+(1− λiu)
(
(1− µi) max
x′∈{ue,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′) + µi max
x′∈{un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
)]}
. (8)
In the present period an unemployed agent incurs the utility cost of searching γi. While
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searching, a job oer for next period arrives with probability λiu, in which case the agent
can choose between employment, unemployment and inactivity. With the remaining
probability 1 − λiu the agent does not receive a new oer and thus can only choose
between unemployment and inactivity. Further the unemployed looses eligibility for
benets with probability µi and keeps eligibility with the remaining probability 1− µi.
e value of the non-eligible unemployed is very similar. e only exception is that
he will not be eligible for benets next period with certainty,
V it (a, z, u
n) = max
(c,a′)∈Bit(a,z,un)
{
log (c)− γi + β
∑
z′∈Z
p(z′|z)
[
λiu max
x′∈{e,un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
+(1− λiu) max
x′∈{un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
]}
.
(9)
Finally, the value for non-active (i.e. not actively searching) agents in country i is
given by
V it (a, z, n) = max
(c,a′)∈Bit(a,z,n)
{
log (c) + β
∑
z′∈Z
p(z′|z)
[
λin max
x′∈{e,un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
+(1− λin) max
x′∈{un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′)
]}
. (10)
e value of the non-active is similar to the non-eligible unemployed. e dierence is
that a non-active does not suer the disutility of search and has a lower probability of a
receiving a job oer next period, i.e. λin < λiu.
Denition of Partial and General Equilibrium. We will now dene two equilibria:
(i) the partial equilibrium for a specic country i, which takes the union interest rate rt as
given; (ii) the general equilibrium for the union, for which the interest rate rt is required
to adjust such that aggregate savings equal aggregate capital in the union.
Individual state variables are assets a ∈ R+, idiosyncratic productivity z ∈ Z , and
employment status x ∈ {e, ue, un, n}. e aggregate state in country i is described by
the joint measure ζ it over assets, labor productivity status and employment status. Let
B(R+) be the Borel σ-algebra of R+, P(Z) the power set over Z = {z¯1, z¯2, ..., z¯nz} and
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P(X) the power set over X = {e, ue, un, n}. Further, let M be the set of all nite
measures over the measurable space {(R+ × Z ×X),B(R+)× P(Z)× P(X)}.
Denition 1 Partial equilibrium in country i: Given sequences of interest rates {rt}∞t=0
and unemployment benet policies {(b¯it, µit)}∞t=0 and given an initial distribution ζ i0, a par-
tial equilibrium in country i is dened by a sequence of value functions {V it }∞t=0, consump-
tion and savings decisions {cit, ait+1}∞t=0, rm production plans {Kit , Lit}∞t=0, payroll taxes
{τ it}∞t=0, wages {ωit}∞t=0 and measures {ζ it}∞t=1, with ζ it ∈M ∀t, such that:
(i) Agents optimize: Given prices, unemployment benet policies and tax rates, the value
function V it and the policy functions for consumption c
i
t and savings a
i
t+1 satisfy the
Bellman equations (7), (8), (9) and (10) with equality for each t ≥ 0.
(ii) Firms optimize: Prices satisfy rt = F iK(K
i
t , L
i
t) − δ and ωit = F iL(Kit , Lit) for each
t ≥ 0.
(iii) e labour market clears:
Lit =
∑
z∈Z
z
∫ ∞
0
ζ it(a, z, e)da ∀t ≥ 0 (11)
(iv) e government budget clears:
τ itω
i
tL
i
t =
∑
z∈Z
bit(z)
∫ ∞
0
ζ it(a, z, u
e)da ∀t ≥ 0 (12)
(v) e law of motion ζ it+1 = H
i
t(ζ
i
t) holds for each t ≥ 0: ereby the function H it :
M→M can be explicitly wrien as follows:
ζ it+1(A×Z ×X ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
∫ ∞
0
T it ((a, z, x);A×Z ×X )ζ it(a, z, x)da,
where T it ((a, z, x);A×Z ×X ) describes the transition probability of moving from
state (a, z, x) in period t to any state (a′, z′, x′) such that a′ ∈ A ⊂ R+, z′ ∈ Z ⊂ Z ,
x′ ∈ X ⊂ X in period t+ 1.6
6e description of the transition function T it is quite involved and therefore deferred to the appendix.
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Denition 2 General equilibrium in the union of countries: Given a collection of se-
quences of unemployment benet policies {{(b¯it, µit)}∞t=0}Ii=1 and given a collection of ini-
tial distributions {ζ i0}Ii=1, a general equilibrium in the union of countries is dened by
sequences of value functions {{V it }∞t=0}Ii=1, policy functions {{cit, ait+1}∞t=0}Ii=1, rm pro-
duction plans {{Lit, Kit}∞t=0}Ii=1, payroll taxes {{τ it}∞t=0}Ii=1, wages {{ωit}∞t=0}Ii=1, measures
{{ζ it}∞t=1}Ii=1, with ζ it ∈ M, and by a sequence of interest rates {rt}∞t=0 such that all con-
ditions of denition 1 are satised for each country i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} and in addition the
capital market clears at the union level, i.e.
I∑
i=1
niKit+1 =
I∑
i=1
ni
∑
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
∫ ∞
0
ait+1(a, z, x)ζ
i
t(a, z, x)da (13)
holds.
Denition 3 Stationary general equilibrium: A stationary general equilibrium is a gen-
eral equilibrium in which all government policies, decision rules, value functions, aggregate
variables and prices are constant in all countries of the union.
4 Calibration
We calibrate the model assuming that in t = 0 the union of I countries is in a stationary
general equilibrium (see Denition 3 above). Hence, we assume that the Euro-Zone as
a whole is a closed economy with no net capital in- or outows. However, we want to
note here that the structural calibrated parameters are not sensitive to this choice. In
particular, if we do not require capital market clearing at the union level and consider
any world interest rate within a reasonable range it does not aect the overall calibration
much. Currently the countries we consider are the eleven countries that formed the
original Euro-Zone in 1999 plus Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia.
e model presented in the previous section has three sets of parameters, which
correspond to the three panels of Table 1. e upper panel describes technological and
preference parameters that are common to all countries. In particular, we assume that
in all countries the capital share of production θ, the depreciation of capital δ, the time
discount factor β and the utility cost of work α is the same. Further, we assume that
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Parameter Denition
θ Capital share of output
δ Capital depreciation rate
β Discount factor
ρz Persistence of productivity
σ2z Variance of prod. shock
α Utility cost of labor
Ai Total factor productivity
γi Utility cost of search
σi Job separation rate
λiu Job nding rate for unemployed
λin Job nding rate for inactive
µi Prob. of loosing UB eligibility
b¯i UB replacement rate
Table 1: Model parameters.
idiosyncratic productivity follows the same Markov process, for which we use a dis-
cretized version of an AR(1) process with persistence ρz and variance σ2z .
e middle and lower panels display parameters that are specic to each country.
e middle panel includes parameters that capture - in a reduced form - dierent labour
market institutions: total factor productivity Ai (which aects wage dierences across
countries), the cost of job search γi, the exogenous job separation rate σi, as well as the
job arrival rates λiu and λin. e lower panel contains parameters that dene country
specic unemployment benet policies (µi, b¯i).
In total our model has 6 + I×7 parameters.e three sets of parameters constitute a
hierarchical structure in the degree to which policy can inuence them. e unemploy-
ment benet policy parameters (µi, b¯i) can be changed relatively easy by governments,
while it takes more complex labour market reforms to change the institutional parame-
ters (Ai, γi, σi, λiu, λin) and it is very hard, if not impossible, to change the parameters of
the rst panel. Given the scope of this paper, in the policy experiments below we only
vary unemployment benet policies (and how these are nanced), though we want to
explicitly mention here that the institutional parameters are not set in stone and can be
changed through structural labour market reforms.
A central aspect of our analysis are the transitions between employment, unem-
ployment and inactivity. Flow statistics are a useful measure since they quantify the
aggregate transitions between labour market states in the data. In order to calibrate
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the model, we therefore use estimated quarterly transition probabilities, and the cor-
responding three average labour market stocks, generously provided by Etienne Lale´.
Lale´ and Tarasonis (2017) estimate these transition probabilities using quarterly data on
prime-age workers (25-54) in the EU countries, from 2004 until 2013. 7 Data on unem-
ployment benets in EU Member States is taken from Esser et al. (2013), and data on
population and average labour earnings from Eurostat.
4.1 Calibration strategy
We now describe in detail how the model is calibrated. First, we set the technological
parameters θ, δ, ρz and σz to the quarterly counterparts of Krusell et al. (2015), who use
monthly data for the US economy to estimate them. We discretize the AR(1) process
for individual productivity process by 5 dierent productivity states using the Tauchen
method. We set the discount factor β to 0.99, implying a subjective discount rate close
to one percent per quarter.
e policy related parameters are chosen as follows. e parameter µi, which is the
conditional probability of remaining eligible for UB next period, is also the inverse of the
average duration of unemployment benets in the model. We therefore set 1/µi to the
maximum duration of eligibility acoording to the law in country i. As described above,
we model the eligibility process in this way because it allows for a simpler representation
and a reduction in the dimensionality of the state space. For the unemployment benet
replacement rates, we set b¯i to the data equivalents in Esser et al. (2013).
e remaining ve country specic parametersAi, γi, σi, λiu and λin are calibrated in
order to match the following ve data moments: the dierentials of average wages across
countries,8 the share of unemployed individuals in the population, the employment-
to-employment, the unemployment-to-employment, and the non-active to employment
ows. Finally, we set the common utility cost of work parameterα such that the population-
weighted average of the fraction of employed agents in the Union matches the data.
Table 2 lists the common parameters, and table 3 contains the country specic pa-
7e underlying data is from the EU-SILC dataset, except Germany which comes from the GSOEP.
8We picked Germany, the largest country in the European Union, as our reference country. So TFP in
Germany is equal to one and for the other countries it is calibrated in order to match wages relative to
German wages.
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Parameter Denition Value
θ Cobb-Douglas capital weight 0.3
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.01
ρz Persistence of individual productivity 0.89
σ2z Variance of individual productivity 0.08
α Utility cost of work 0.89
β Discount factor 0.99
Table 2: Common Parameters. Time period is 1 quarter; r clears the EU capital market.
rameters for the calibrated European countries. We also report the tax rates τ i that clear
the government budget in each country.
Ai γi σi λiu λ
i
n b¯
i 1/µi τ i(%)
Austria 0.92 0.63 0.04 0.25 0.08 0.28 2.27 0.92
Belgium 1.01 0.60 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.37 19.70 2.13
Germany 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.23 3.94 0.45
Estonia 0.57 0.35 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.46 3.86 2.94
Spain 0.81 0.68 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.33 7.80 4.43
Finland 0.97 0.40 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.36 7.58 3.75
France 0.93 0.30 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.35 7.88 1.90
Greece 0.82 0.90 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.65 3.94 5.60
Ireland 1.05 0.55 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.36 3.94 1.97
Italy 0.92 0.48 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.09 2.58 0.25
Luxembourg 1.15 0.95 0.02 0.17 0.04 0.27 3.94 0.53
Latvia 0.45 0.30 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.57 2.95 1.60
Netherlands 0.87 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.13 0.35 3.50 1.00
Portugal 0.69 0.49 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.36 5.91 4.98
Slovenia 0.77 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.65 1.97 0.98
Slovakia 0.54 0.25 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.08 1.97 0.16
Table 3: Country specic parameters.
4.2 ality of the Fit
In this section we investigate how well the model ts the European labour markets. In
the calibration described above, several labour market moments were targeted. ese
are shown in Figures 3 to 6. In Figure 3 we observe that the average unemployment rate
in Spain, Greece, Latvia and Portugal is much higher than the European average, while
in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands it is lower. e persistence of
employment (Figure 4) is high in almost all countries. e exceptions are Spain, Finland
and Portugal who have substantial ows out of employment in each quarter. e ows
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from unemployment to employment (Figure 5) are quite heterogeneous across European
countries. Interestingly, it is lowest in Germany, a country with rather low structural
unemployment. By contrast, Austria, which has similar average unemployment rates
as Germany, has the highest ow from unemployment to employment. We observe
substantial heterogeneity also in the ows from inactivity to employment (Figure 6).
For example, in Finland this ow is much higher than in the other countries.
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Figure 3: Unemployment.
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Figure 4: Employment-Employment Flows.
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Figure 5: Unemployment-Employment Flows.
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Figure 6: Inactivity-Employment Flows.
e employment ratios were not targeted country by country, but the union average
was. At the country level, the comparison with the data is shown in Figure 7. e model
does very well in replicating the heterogeneity in stocks of employment that we observe
in the data.
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Figure 7: Employment.
Given that the model shares of employed and unemployed agents is in line with the
data counterparts, the model unemployment rate is also as in the data (Figure 8). Another
important moment in the model is the average persistence of an unemployment spell in
each country, which is not targeted directly by the calibration. e model predictions
is shown in Figure 9. By and large the model performs well also along this dimension,
though there are some cases where it underpredicts (Estonia, Greece, Portugal), and one
where it overpredicts (Slovenia) the average duration of an unemployment spell by more
than one quarter.
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Figure 8: Unemployment Rate.
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Figure 9: Average Unemployment Duration.
For completeness, the persistence of inactivity is shown in Figure 10 below. Again,
the model does a good job in replicating the data with only minor deviations.
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Figure 10: Inactivity to Inactivity Flows.
4.3 Diversity of Labour Market Institutions
Our calibration makes apparent that labour market institutions vary substantially across
countries. We visualize this in the Figures 11 to 13. Figure 11 shows the job arrival
rate for non-searchers (λin, horizontal axis) and searchers (λiu, vertical axis) for each
of the calibrated economies. We observe that these two rates are correlated but their
values dier substantially across countries. For example, in Finland, the Netherlands
and Estonia the job nding rate for not actively searching individuals is higher than
10%, while in Greece, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg it is lower than 5%.
Figure 12 plots average the job nding rate for non-employed on the x-axis, but this
time against the job separation rate σi on the y-axis. It hence gives an idea of the rigidity
of the respective labour markets. Countries in the southeast have the high job nding
and low separation rates. Countries in the northwest corner have high job destruction
risk and low chances of nding a job while not working. Note for instance that while
Germany and Spain have similar job nding rates for the non-employed, job destruciton
in Spain in roughly 5 times higher, contributing to higher unemployment in Spain.
Finally, Figure 13 shows that the countries also dier substantially with respect to
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their unemployment benet system. It plots the replacement rate vs. the average dura-
tion for which unemployed are eligible to receive benets.
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Figure 11: Job Arrival Rates
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Figure 12: Labour Market Rigidity
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Figure 13: National Unemplyoment Benet Systems.
5 Policy Experiments
Based on our calibration, which initializes the economy in t = 0, we are now able to
perform several experiments and analyze the evolution of countries’ labour markets and
other macroeconomic variables under dierent congurations of unemployment policy
for t ≥ 1. In this part of the analysis we restrict the set of countries to a number of
ten: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy Luxembourg and
Netherlands. ese countries account for more than 90% of the Euro-Zone’s total GDP.
As we pointed out earlier, a key motivation for an EUIS would be that it may pro-
vide insurance against country specic uctuations in unemployment and, in particular,
against uctuations in the tax burden associated with its nancing. In Subsection 5.1,
we directly study the pure insurance eects of such policy from the viewpoint of indi-
vidual European countries. In this experiment, the EUIM only insures countries against
country-specic uctuations in unemployment, while keeping the benet systems at the
status quo. We will see that the welfare benets of such an insurance system are very
small.
As we have seen above, the ten countries are quite heterogeneous in their labour
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market institutions, suggesting that the individually optimal benet systems could vary
substantially across countries. If this was the case and in light of the result that the bene-
ts of insuring against country specic shocks are small, one may doubt the desirability
of a common European unemployment insurance system. In Subsection 5.2, we ask
what the countries’ individually optimal benet systems are and whether an agreement
to a common harmonized European benet system could actually be achieved. For this
means we compute the optimal unilateral reform separately for each country (in partial
equilibrium). We nd that the optimal unemployment benet systems are surprisingly
similar. In all countries it is optimal to provide an unlimited duration of eligibility and
the optimal replacement rates vary between 20% and 45%.
Abstracting from other political constraints, one may argue that these slight dier-
ences are sucient to implement reforms at the country level rather than at the union
level. We show that such an argumentation is only true if one assumes that the Euro-
Zone as a whole is a small open economy. If, on the other hand, prices are aected by
unemployment policy, it neglects spill over eects across countries. In particular, we
show that if all European countries would reform their system simultaneously and the
capital market is required to clear at the union level, i.e. in general equilibrium, the very
same UI benet systems that are optimal in partial equilibrium turn out to be actually
welfare worsening in most of the countries. e reason for this result is that increasing
the generosity of the UI benet system in almost all countries, reduces private savings
and hence the aggregate, European, capital stock. As a consequence the marginal prod-
uct of labour declines everywhere. is is bad for poor agents, who, irrespective whether
they are currently employed or not, derive most of their lifetime income from wages.
In reality, the responsiveness of prices to policy changes is likely in between the two
extreme cases we consider - the Euro-Zone as small open vs. a closed economy. e point
we want to make is that if prices are at least to some degree aected by unemployment
policy, lack of coordination across European member states may result in detrimental
reforms, thus providing a rationale for centralizing unemployment policy at the Euro-
pean level. In the last subsection 5.3, we therefore search for a common harmonized
European benet system that is welfare improving in all countries of the union in gen-
eral equilibrium. We consider two versions of this experiment that dier in the way the
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governments’ budgets clear. First, we consider a fully harmonized system, where the tax
rate in each country is the same and the ten individual government budget constraints
(12) are replaced by a single European one. Such a system, by construction, results in
transfers from countries with structurally low unemployment rates to countries with
high unemployment and thus does not achieve unanimous agreement among member
states. Interestingly, for some of the net payers, the welfare gains of such a reform are
positive, suggesting that in these countries the current unemployment benet system is
far from optimal. In the second version of this experiment the tax rates which nance
the harmonized system vary across countries such that each government’s budget con-
straint (12) is satised. Such a system eliminates cross-country transfers and we show
that with a replacement rate of 15% all countries are beer o than in the status quo.
5.1 Insuring Country Level Fluctuations Only
As we mentioned above, the main argument for an EUIM can be that it may provide
insurance against country level uctuations in unemployment. is insurance might be
very valuable as European countries (especially recently aer the crisis) have a hard time
to nance the increasing scal burden of unemployment using debt because of tighter
decit requirements. In the following experiment we provide the “best chance” for these
insurance benets to realise as we assume that individual countries have no access to
any debt or savings to smooth out unemployment uctuations.
e experiment is constructed as follows. At time t = 0 the country is in its steady
state. At the end of this period, when all decisions are already made, it becomes aware
that at t = 1 it is hit by a completely unanticipated negative shock. Aer the shock hits
the country returns back to its steady state in a deterministic and gradual way.
Similarly to Krusell et al. (2015), we model shocks as hiing simultaneously TFP (A)
and exogenous labor market ows (σ, λu and λn).9 In particular, a deep recession will
be modelled as a drop in TFP and job arrival rates and a rise in the separation rate. We
model economic uctuations in this way, because it is well-known that uctuations of
TFP alone are not able to generate large enough uctuations of unemployment if output
9Note that in order to economize on notation we suppressed the time subscript in these parameters
in the description of our model. In most of our analysis these parameters are indeed treated as constant.
Only in the present subsection we deviate from this assumption.
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uctuations are reasonable. is issue is amplied in our framework by the fact that job
creation and job destruction are not modelled endogenously.
Given all these assumptions, note that aer the shock is realised the economy is fol-
lowing a deterministic paern and eventually converges back to its steady state. Hence,
aer the realisation of the shock agents have perfect foresight when solving their dy-
namic optimisation problems. We consider two cases: nancial autarky and insurance
through the EUIS. In nancial autarky, along the transition the tax rate needs to adjust
to balance the government budget constraint every period. In the case of the EUIS, we
assume that countries can get full insurance against the rise in unemployment expendi-
ture and thus can leave the tax rate at its steady state value. We assume that the shock
is a zero probability event and therefore comes at a complete surprise to agents. is
assumption also implies that leaving the tax rate with the EUIS at the steady state value
is actuarially (from an ex-ante perspective) fair.
We want to note here that the zero probability assumption serves one purpose: To
calculate an upper bound for the actual welfare gains that a EUIS would achieve when its
sole purpose was to insurance against country level uctuations in unemployment ex-
penditures. If we relax this assumption and assume that the shock happens with some
positive probability, an actuarially fair EUIS would imply a higher tax rate than the
steady state tax rate, i.e. countries would have to pay an insurance premium. is re-
duces consumption and thus welfare. It also would imply that agents would prepare
themselves for the possibility of such a shock through higher savings, in which case the
smoothing of taxes is less valuable than in case of the fully unanticipated shock.
We calculate the welfare eect of the introduction of this EUIS by comparing the
welfare of autarky and the EUIS of each individual at the end of period t = 0, i.e. aer
learning that shocks will occur next period. at we calculate the welfare gains condi-
tional on the negative shock happening again provides an upper bound for the actual
insurance gains.
e argument that we want to make with this exercise is that even in a highly stylized
scenario which in several dimensions is constructed in a way to increase welfare gains
of an EUIS relative to what we would expect in reality, the gains of insuring country
level uctuations are small.
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Figure 14: Shock process in France
e Shocks. e combination of shocks has the following structure. Consider rst
total factor productivity in country i. At t = 0 the country is in steady state, i.e. Ai0 = Ai.
At t = 1 a negative shock of size A hits,
log(Ai1) = (1− A) log(Ai).
e shock has persistence ρA and moves back to the steady state in a gradual and deter-
ministic way,
log(Ait) = ρA log(A
i
t−1) + (1− ρA) log(Ai) for t ≥ 1.
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Similarly, the job separation rate and the job arrival rates are hit in t = 1,
σi1 = (1 + σ)σ
i
λiu,1 = (1− λu)λiu
λin,1 = (1− λn)λin.
Aer that they gradually return back to their steady state values, i.e. for t ≥ 1
σit = ρσσ
i
t−1 + (1− ρσ)σi
λiu,t = ρλuλ
i
u,t−1 + (1− ρλu)λiu
λin,t = ρλnλ
i
n,t−1) + (1− ρλn)λin
holds.
We consider a deep recession with TFP dropping by 10% (A = 0.1), the job sepa-
ration rate doubling (σ = 1), and the job nding rates being reduced by half (λu =
λn = 0.5). We further assume that ρA = ρσ = ρλu = ρλn = 0.75. Figure 14 depicts the
evolution of the shock for the case of France.
e shock induces changes in labour markets, which are depicted in Figure 15. To
some extent these responses are driven directly by the exogenous shock. For example a
higher separation rate reduces employment by construction. But to a substantial degree
they result from endogenous decisions of agents. For example, we observe that unem-
ployment decreases at impact and only later rises above its steady state value (middle
panel) and that at the same time inactivity increases at impact and gradually decreases
later (lower panel). e reason is that because of lower wages and a lower likelihood to
nd a job even when searching, many agents are not willing to incur the utility loss of
searching and instead decide not to participate. Only later, when economic conditions
improved, they start searching for a job again. Further, many not separated agents de-
cide to quit working because of the reduction in wages. In the upper panel we see that
already during the rst period (before the shock hits but aer agents learned about the
coming recession) employment declines.
If the country is in nancial autarky, this mechanism is amplied through a rise in
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Figure 15: Labor Market in France
taxes, distorting incentives to (try to) work further. Figure 16 shows how taxes in France
would evolve under autarky (solid line) as opposed to the case in which the country is
fully insured against uctuations in benet expenditures (dashed line). In France such
a shock would result in a gradual increase in the payroll tax that is from 1.9% to about
3.3% at the peak of the recession.
We performed this very same exercise for all our ten countries. e tax rates in au-
tarky for all countries are shown in Figure 17. We saw before that the steady state taxes
which nance the country specic unemployment benet systems dier substantially
across country. is is a consequence of both dierent unemployment benet policies
and dierent labour market institutions that determine job creation and destruction. As
we can see in Figure 17 these dierence not only aect the steady state level of taxes but
also their responses to shocks.
Table 4 shows the welfare gains of insuring against country level uctuations in
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taxes. Remember that they are computed conditional on the shock happening. One
obvious feature of these results is the very small magnitude of the average welfare gains.
is is due to the fact that most welfare gains come from the small improvement of
consumption smoothing for the employed. In fact, the only reason why also unemployed
and non-active have positive welfare gains is because they may be employed, and thus
paying taxes, in the future.
is exercise shows that risk-sharing by itself does not provide a strong rationale
for the introduction of an EUIS. In light of this result one may doubt the desirability
of a common European unemployment benet scheme. Especially, since the observed
heterogeneity in labour market institutions (see section 4) suggests that the optimal
benet system could dier substantially across countries, making it dicult to reach a
consensus across Europe. In the next section we want to evaluate this claim and analyze
how dierent optimal benet systems are across countries.
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Figure 17: Taxes in Autarky
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Belgium 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.15
Germany 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Spain 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.09 0.21
Finland 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.16 0.24
France 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.09
Ireland 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.09
Italy 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Luxembourg 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Netherlands 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
Table 4: Welfare gains (in % CEV) of insuring country level uctuations
5.2 National Reforms of the Unemployment Benet System
Before trying to harmonize European unemployment insurance systems, it is worth-
while to compute the optimal unemployment insurance system individually for each
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country. is gives us an idea whether the substantial heterogeneity in labour market
institutions across Europe actually allow for such a harmonization or whether they make
it impossible to reach a consensus across Europe. In the following subsection 5.2.1 we
therefore compute the optimal national unemployment benet reforms separately for
each country, in partial equilibrium. It turns out that optimal national benet systems
are similar but not identical. To be specic, all countries nd an unlimited duration of
benet receipt optimal while optimal replacement rates vary between 20% and 45%.
One might think that even if optimal policies are similar, countries are still beer
o by reforming the system to their individual optimum rather than to join a common
European scheme. In subsection 5.2.2 we show that in such a scenario it is important to
take into account that the European Union has a common capital market. In particular,
we show that sticking to the partial equilibrium analysis would result in large imbal-
ances between capital and savings across Europe, unlikely to be sustained in reality.
e reason is that the optimal partial equilibrium reforms are rather generous, result-
ing in a large decline in precautionary savings. In section 5.2.3 we show that in general
equilibrium this would result in a substantial decline in the capital stock. e induced
changes in equilibrium prices, in particular a substantial decrease in Europe-wide wages
would render seven out of the ten reforms that seem optimal in partial equilibrium, ac-
tually welfare worsening. is suggests that optimal unemployment insurance should
be designed at the broader European level.
5.2.1 Optimal Unilateral Reform
In this section we compute the optimal reform for each country separately. For each
country iwe ask the question: What is the optimal unilateral once-and-for-all change in
(b¯i, µi) if only country i was to change its benet system and the other countries would
stick to the status quo? is analysis is done in partial equilibrium, i.e. we assume
that a single country does not aect the equilibrium interest rate when changing its
unemployment benet policy even thought the savings decisions of its citizens change.
is implies that the marginal product of capital and hence the capital-labour ratio is
pinned down by the interest rate and as a consequence also wages are unaected by the
change in policy.
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We assume that the government maximizes the utilitarian welfare of its citizens.
Formally, the government in country i chooses a pair of policy parameters (b¯i1, µi1) with
b¯it = b¯
i
1 and µit = µi1 for all t ≥ 1 such that social welfare is maximized,10
max
(b¯i1,µ
i
1)
SW (b¯i1, µ
i
1) = max
(b¯i1,µ
i
1)
∑
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
∫ ∞
0
V i0 (a, z, x; b¯
i
1, µ
i
1)ζ
i
0(a, z, x)da.
ereby, individually optimal policies, rm production plans and taxes adjust such that
all equilibrium conditions in Denition 1 are satised. Note that for each individual
we compute the value in the initial period and therefore take into account the whole
transitional dynamics to the new steady state.
In order to be able to interpret the welfare gains associated with the policy reform,
we translate them into consumption equivalent variation. In particular, ∆i(a, z, x) de-
nes the per period percentage increase in consumption that you would need to give an
individual with initial state (a, z, x) when the benet system is kept at the status quo
such that he is indierent between this status quo and the optimal reform. e aggregate
welfare gain is then dened as
∆i =
∑
x∈X
∑
z∈Z
∫ ∞
0
∆i(a, z, x)ζ i(a, z, x)da.
Similarly, we dene the aggregate welfare gain of the employed, unemployed eligible,
unemployed non-eligible and inactive as
∆ix =
∑
z∈Z
∫∞
0
∆i(a, z, x)ζ i(a, z, x)da∑
z∈Z
∫∞
0
ζ i(a, z, x)da
for x ∈ {e, ue, un, n}.
Table 5 shows the current benet policy and the optimal reform in each country
along with the taxes that nance this policy. For the optimal reform we report the new
steady state taxes τ i∞. Note, however, that along the transition taxes vary in order to
clear the government budget period by period.
We see that despite the substantial heterogeneity in labour market institutions, opti-
mal unemployment benet policies are surprisingly similar. In particular, in all countries
10Here we add the policy parameters as arguments in the value function to make it explicit that the
values depend on policy parameters.
40
an unlimited duration of eligibility is optimal. is policy eliminates the risk of not nd-
ing a job before losing eligibility. ere is some variation in optimal replacement rates
but all are in the range of 20 to 45 percent.11 e main dierence are the tax rates that
nance the rather similar benet policies.
Country Status o Optimal Reform ∆
1/µi0 b¯
i
0 τ
i
0(%) 1/µ
i
1 b¯
i
1 τ
i
∞(%)
Austria 2 0.28 0.92 ∞ 0.45 4.61 1.51
Belgium 20 0.37 2.13 ∞ 0.25 1.36 0.16
Germany 4 0.23 0.45 ∞ 0.25 3.15 1.40
Spain 8 0.33 4.43 ∞ 0.45 11.26 2.27
Finland 8 0.36 3.75 ∞ 0.20 0.90 0.33
France 8 0.35 1.90 ∞ 0.35 3.75 1.18
Ireland 4 0.36 1.97 ∞ 0.45 8.37 1.72
Italy 3 0.09 0.25 ∞ 0.45 9.22 3.23
Luxembourg 4 0.27 0.53 ∞ 0.45 3.52 1.07
Netherlands 4 0.35 1.00 ∞ 0.25 4.53 0.89
Table 5: Optimal National Reforms of the Benet System
For example, there are ve countries for which a replacement rate of 45% is optimal.
In Ireland, Italy and Spain the more generous benet scheme comes along with large
increases in the tax rate, which eventually reach 8.4%, 9.2%, and 11.3%, respectively. In
Austria and in Luxembourg, on the other hand, the same benet system is optimal but
the tax rates only reach values of 4.6% and 3.5%, respectively. e reason for these are
the structurally dierent labour market institutions. In particular, in section 4 we saw
that in Spain the job separation rate is much higher, while in Ireland and Italy the job
nding rates are much lower then in the other countries.
e last column shows the aggregate welfare gains. In Belgium this gain is less than
0.2% of consumption equivalent variation as the current benet system is not too far
from the optimal one. In particular the duration of eligibility is much higher than in all
the other countries. Still there are some gains from extending the duration to innity
and slightly reducing the replacement rate. On the other extreme the welfare gains for
Italy are large, about 3.2% CEV. According to our model the current benet system in
Italy with an average duration of eligibility of 3 quarters and a replacement rate of less
than 10% is way too restrictive.
11Our optimization routine optimized over increments of 0.05 in the replacement rate dimension.
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Of course, not every individual in a country benets from the reform in the same way.
Table 6 shows the welfare gains at a more dis-aggregated level. We see that in countries
where the unemployment system becomes more generous (Austria, Spain, France, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg) the main beneciaries are the eligible unemployed as they are
the ones who are most directly aected. However, even if the gains are smaller, also the
other agents benet from the reform as they might be eligible unemployed in the future.
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria 1.40 3.06 2.62 1.57 1.51
Belgium 0.13 0.28 0.70 0.18 0.16
Germany 1.35 5.20 1.42 1.11 1.40
Spain 2.07 4.16 3.87 1.74 2.27
Finland 0.34 0.14 0.51 0.37 0.33
France 1.11 2.63 1.44 0.84 1.18
Ireland 1.54 4.52 4.37 1.40 1.72
Italy 3.06 9.42 6.15 2.50 3.23
Luxembourg 0.94 4.05 2.56 1.12 1.07
Netherlands 0.85 2.98 0.79 0.71 0.89
Table 6: Welfare gains (in % CEV) of individually optimal reforms
Finland has the most restrictive reform. Even if the duration of eligibility is extended,
the replacement rate is substantially reduced to 20%. As a consequence the eligible un-
employed benet the least from the reform. e other agents benet more through the
reduction in taxes. is is directly true for the employed. But also the non-eligible unem-
ployed and the inactive like the reform more than the eligible unemployed. e reason
is that these agents will sooner earn wage income and pay taxes than they will receive
unemployment benets. Remember that the only way to gain eligibility for benets for
these agents is by going through employment and being exogenously separated from
the job.
5.2.2 Simultaneous Reforms - e Euro-Zone as a Small Open Economy
Remember that we computed the optimal reform above sequentially, each time from the
perspective of an individual country, which takes interest rates and wages as given. We
treated this single country as a small open economy and assumed that eventual capital
in- or outows resulting from the reform are absorbed from outside the country.
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We now ask the question: What happens if all countries would simultaneously re-
form their system to the individually optimal reforms computed above?
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Figure 18: Capital and Savings in the Union under Open Economy Assumption
To answer this question an assumption on how the capital market clears is neces-
sary. An extreme assumption would be that the Euro-Zone as a whole is a small open
economy and therefore prices would not change even if all countries would change their
unemployment benet systems at the same time.12 In such a case the answer is simple:
e same set of reforms as the one computed above (Table 5) is optimal and it will result
in the same welfare gains (Table 6). However, the reforms would imply large imbalances
between total European savings and total European capital. Figure 18 shows that in this
scenario private savings decline substantially while the capital stock actually rises as a
result of the reforms. Forty years aer the reform about one third of the total European
12Note that in such a case, also at t = 0 the capital market need not clear and one could instead pick
another world interest rate. We experimented with interest rates in a reasonable range and this did not
aect optimal policies much.
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capital stock is nanced from outside the union. e unlimited duration of eligibility
reduces the risk of individuals substantially and therefore leads to a reduction in precau-
tionary savings. On the other hand, Figure 19 shows that the new policies, on aggregate,
induce many inactive agents to start searching. As some of them eventually nd jobs
also employment and thus aggregate eective labour increases. As a consequence the
marginal product of capital increases and rms demand more capital.
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Figure 19: Aggregate Labour Market States under Open Economy Assumption
5.2.3 Simultaneous Reforms - e Euro-Zone as a Closed Economy
While one can challenge the view that the Euro-Zone as a whole is a closed economy,
one can certainly reject the hypothesis that it is too small to have any impact on the
interest rate. In particular, the imbalances in savings and capital which we see in Figure
18 are way beyond what we observe in the data.
erefore, we now assume that there cannot be imbalances in capital and savings for
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the union as a whole. In particular, we solve for the path of interest rates {rt}∞t=1 that
clears the capital market at the union level (condition (13)). is change in the interest
rates will change optimal rm production plans and optimal individual behaviour and
it will change the equilibrium path of wages in all countries.
e resulting welfare eects are strikingly dierent. In Table 7 we observe that gen-
eral equilibrium eects not only have negative eects in eight countries, in seven out of
the ten countries they even reverse the sign of the welfare gains. Only in Belgium and
in Finland agents benet from general equilibrium eects. In Luxembourg the gains are
still positive but substantially lower than under the open economy assumption.
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria -0.39 1.12 0.43 -0.21 -0.30
Belgium 1.16 0.96 1.19 1.03 1.12
Germany -0.82 2.72 -1.20 -0.82 -0.77
Spain -0.39 1.43 0.72 -0.36 -0.17
Finland 1.83 1.53 1.96 1.69 1.78
France -0.44 0.98 -0.33 -0.51 -0.37
Ireland -0.31 2.32 1.55 -0.21 -0.12
Italy -0.32 5.05 1.56 -0.32 -0.10
Luxembourg -0.01 2.76 1.08 0.24 0.10
Netherlands -3.09 -1.48 -3.95 -3.15 -3.09
Table 7: Welfare gains (in % CEV) of Reforms under Closed Economy Assumption
How can these results be explained? First, note that the aggregate capital stock is
now substantially lower than in the open economy case. Capital is now solely nanced
by the saving of Euro-Zone citizens and as mentioned above the reforms on average
reduce savings. Figure 20 depicts the evolution of capital (savings) when the capital
market clears at the union level.
is reduction in the capital stock causes an increase in the marginal product of
capital but reduces the marginal product of labour. As a consequence, interest rates
rise but wages decline aer the reform (see Figure 21). Note that wages vary across
countries but their relative proportions are unaected. To be specic, for any pair i, j ∈
{1, 2, ..., I} and any t ≥ 0 it holds that wit/wjt = Ai/Aj . is implies that wages decline
in all countries of the union.
e movements in prices are good for agents who derive most of their net present
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Figure 20: Capital and Savings in the Union under Closed Economy Assumption
live time income from capital but bad for those whose main income source are wages.
Welfare gains are computed in percent of initial consumption implying that if an initially
poor and an initially rich agent experience the same consumption increase in absolute
value, the welfare gain for the poor agent will be higher. Hence, what maers mostly for
the aggregate welfare eects are the changes in the income composition of poor agents.
Agents with lile assets do not gain much from the higher interest rate but they lose
substantially from lower wages. In the right panel of Figure 21 we see that in the long
run wages decrease by about 1.5%, the same order of magnitude as the average decline
in welfare through GE eects. It is important to note that by and large all groups in
a country lose or benet from general equilibrium eects in a similar way (compare
Tables 6 and 7). At rst glance this seems surprising since non-eligible unemployed and
non-active agents currently do not have wage income while the other two groups do,
the employed directly and the eligible unemployed indirectly as their unemployment
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Figure 21: Equilibrium Prices under Closed Economy Assumption
benets are proportional to wages. e reason for this result is that mobility across
labour market states is higher than across wealth. For example, a currently poor non-
eligible unemployed will sooner be employed and get wage income than he will be rich
enough to derive most of his lifetime income from capital returns.
Now why are there two countries, Belgium and Finland, who benet from the gen-
eral equilibrium eects? Because these two countries are relatively rich on average and
have a relatively equal distribution of wealth. is means that the wealth owned by
consumption poor agents is higher than in the other countries and therefore their con-
sumption losses are not big enough to oset the overall consumption gains.
e general equilibrium feedback eects from prices in turn change the behaviour
of agents. For example, in Figure 22 we observe that the decline in inactivity is muted
compared to the open economy case and that employment declines, while before it was
increasing. Higher interest income allows inactive agents to run down their assets at a
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lower pace and at the same time lower wages make employment less aractive.
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Figure 22: Aggregate Labour Market States under Closed Economy Assumption
In sum, the results of this section are twofold: (i) According to our model current
national unemployment benet systems are not optimal and for some countries there
is a large potential for welfare improvement through policy reform; (ii) An integrated
European capital market causes unemployment policies in some European countries to
aect the citizens of other European countries even under the assumption that labor is
not mobile. e laer implies that lack of coordination across member states may result
in detrimental reforms and thus provide a rationale to centralize unemployment policy
at the European level. is is the direction we explore next.
5.3 Harmonized European Unemployment Insurance Scheme
Can we nd a harmonized European unemployment benet system that is welfare im-
proving in all countries of the union? We nd that the answer to this question depends
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on how such a system is nanced. If contribution payments vary such that cross-country
transfers are eliminated, we nd that a harmonized benet system with an unlimited du-
ration and a replacement rate of 15% is welfare improving in all countries. On the other
hand, we could not nd such a system, when it is nanced jointly at the union level.
5.3.1 Joint Financing on the Union Level
Let us rst consider jointly nanced benet systems. In this experiment, we replace
individual countries’ budget constraints with a common European one. Instead of I
government budget constraints (equation (12)) which solve for I dierent tax rates, there
is only one tax rate that clears the union budget constraint
τt
I∑
i=1
ωitL
i
t = b¯
I∑
i=1
ωit
∑
z∈Z
zt
∫ ∞
0
ζ it(a, z, u
e)da ∀t ≥ 0. (14)
Note that both the tax rate and the replacement rate are independent of i. As we men-
tioned above not every country would agree to this form of nancing no maer what
the benet system is.
In Table 8 we show the results for the benet system with an unlimited duration of
eligibility and a common replacement rate of 15%. We see that while most countries gain
from the reform, there are three exceptions, all of whom are net payers: Austria, France
and the Netherlands. Interestingly, not all countries which are net payers lose from the
reform. In particular the welfare gains in Belgium, Germany, Finland and Ireland are
positive even though these countries pay substantial transfers, between 0.14% and 0.87%
of their respective GDP. is result is another indicator that current unemployment ben-
et policies are far from optimal in some of the countries.
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Country Status o Optimal Reform ∆ Transfer/GDP
1/µi0 b¯
i
0 τ
i
0(%) 1/µ
i
1 b¯
i
1 τ
i
∞(%)
Austria 2 0.28 0.92 ∞ 0.15 1.47 -0.29 -0.51
Belgium 20 0.37 2.13 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.25 -0.71
Germany 4 0.23 0.45 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.20 -0.14
Spain 8 0.33 4.43 ∞ 0.15 1.47 1.45 0.74
Finland 8 0.36 3.75 ∞ 0.15 1.47 1.04 -0.87
France 8 0.35 1.90 ∞ 0.15 1.47 -0.06 -0.16
Ireland 4 0.36 1.97 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.68 -0.09
Italy 3 0.09 0.25 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.87 0.29
Luxembourg 4 0.27 0.53 ∞ 0.15 1.47 -0.40 -0.64
Netherlands 4 0.35 1.00 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.17 0.07
Table 8: Harmonized Benet System Financed Jointly
5.3.2 Country-Specic Contribution Payments
Let us next consider the case of varying contribution payments across countries, which
clear each country’s government budget constraint separately. To be specic, in this
experiment we require that condition (12) holds for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}. Table 9 shows
that in this case the very same benet system (unlimited duration, replacement rate of
15%) that we considered above is welfare improving in all countries of the union.
To understand why this mix of taxes and benets is welfare improving in all countries
it is worthwhile to remember three ndings of our analysis so far: (i) European countries
have structurally dierent labour market institutions which as a consequence lead to
very dierent long term averages in employment, unemployment and inactivity (section
4); (ii) Despite these dierences, the optimal unilateral reforms are surprisingly similar
with an unlimited duration of unemployment benets and replacement rates between
20% and 45% (section 5.2.1). (iii) If all countries were to reform their benet systems
by themselves to their respective individual optima this would result in a substantial
decline in the capital stock. As a consequence wages across Europe would be lower and
especially poor agents, who derive most of their lifetime income from labour, would
experience large welfare losses (section 5.2.3).
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Country Status o Optimal Reform ∆
1/µi0 b¯
i
0 τ
i
0(%) 1/µ
i
1 b¯
i
1 τ
i
∞(%)
Austria 2 0.28 0.92 ∞ 0.15 0.73 0.23
Belgium 20 0.37 2.13 ∞ 0.15 0.45 0.92
Germany 4 0.23 0.45 ∞ 0.15 1.27 0.38
Spain 8 0.33 4.43 ∞ 0.15 2.53 0.62
Finland 8 0.36 3.75 ∞ 0.15 0.22 2.03
France 8 0.35 1.90 ∞ 0.15 1.23 0.11
Ireland 4 0.36 1.97 ∞ 0.15 1.34 0.79
Italy 3 0.09 0.25 ∞ 0.15 1.90 0.60
Luxembourg 4 0.27 0.53 ∞ 0.15 0.55 0.32
Netherlands 4 0.35 1.00 ∞ 0.15 1.57 0.08
Table 9: Optimal Harmonized Benet System Financed at the Country Level
ese three ndings help in the design of a collectively optimal unemployment ben-
et system. e rst nding says that for a system to be politically sustainable we need
varying contribution payments across countries. As we have seen, a common, jointly
nanced, system would result in transfers from countries with structurally low unem-
ployment to countries with structurally high unemployment. e former, at least some
of them, would not participate in such a scheme. We therefore demand from the system
that it eliminates cross-country transfers. is is achieved through varying tax rates
that clear government budgets at the national level, i.e. that satisfy condition (12). We
again observe that in countries with structurally weak labour market institutions such
as Spain or Italy these tax rates are substantially higher than in other countries with
more ecient institutions such as Belgium or Finland.
e second nding suggests that it makes sense to harmonize the benet system and
we indeed nd that an unlimited duration of eligibility and a replacement rate of 15%
is welfare improving in all countries. As before the unlimited duration eliminates the
risk of losing eligibility before nding a job. However, the replacement rate is lower
than in any of the unilaterally optimal reforms computed above, where the minimal
replacement rate was the Finnish one with 20%. e third nding explains why this is
the case. We have seen that a too generous benet system discourages savings, which in
general equilibrium reduces wages, the main income source of poor agents. In Figure 23
we see that in the long-run the capital stock is reduced by only about 2% and 3%, while
before it was between 7% and 8%. As a consequence the eects on prices are muted as
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can be seen in Figure 24. In particular, the wage decline is only about half to what we
observed in Figure 21.
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Figure 23: Capital and Savings with Harmonized UI Benet System
Both, less generous unemployment benets and higher wages, make employment
more and inactivity less aractive and as a consequence aggregate employment is sta-
bilized (Figure 25).
As before, the welfare eects are not only heterogeneous across countries but also
across dierent groups within each country. is is shown in Table 10. We see that while
the size varies, the sign is positive almost everywhere. In fact, only one single group does
not benet from the reform, the eligible unemployed in Belgium. e reason is that the
current benet system in Belgium has already a rather high duration of eligibility (20
quarters) and its current replacement rate is much higher than aer the reform (37% vs.
15%). What stands out are the high welfare gains in Finland. In Table 10 we see that the
tax rate aer the reform is much lower than before. Together with strong labour market
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Figure 24: Equilibrium Prices with Harmonized UI Benet System
institutions that make the duration of non-employment very short, at least for people
who are willing to work, these tax reductions lead to substantial welfare gains for all
groups.
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria 0.21 0.56 0.47 0.24 0.23
Belgium 1.05 -0.35 0.15 0.81 0.92
Germany 0.34 2.34 0.44 0.28 0.38
Spain 0.65 0.44 0.65 0.58 0.62
Finland 2.09 1.64 1.83 1.90 2.03
France 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.11
Ireland 0.77 1.07 1.31 0.73 0.79
Italy 0.48 2.73 1.58 0.51 0.60
Luxembourg 0.30 0.85 0.51 0.33 0.32
Netherlands 0.06 0.91 0.13 0.03 0.08
Table 10: Welfare gains in (in % CEV) with Harmonized UI Benet System
53
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Quarters after the Reform
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pe
rc
en
t o
f P
op
ul
at
io
n 
in
 U
ni
on
Employment
Unemployment
Inactivity
Figure 25: Aggregate Labour Market States with Harmonized UI Benet System
6 Conclusion
is paper is aimed at assessing the value of a European Unemployment Insurance Sys-
tem (EUIS) and, in particular, how it should be designed as a constrained ecient mech-
anism. We take as a constraint the current labour market institutions which determine
dierences in job destruction and the likelihood to receive oers by the unemployed
(searching for a job) and the inactive (not actively searching), we also limit the scope of
unemployment insurance contracts to contracts dened by their coverage duration and
their replacement rate. Our work provides a quantitative proof of the potential gains
that market reforms – not just labour market reforms – can achieve in many European
countries. In fact, the rst contribution of this paper is to provide a novel diagnosis
of European labour markets. e second, which is almost a corollary of the rst, is to
show quantitatively that country-specic structural parameters play a determinant role
in explaining the dierent performance of labour markets across the EU.
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Based on this calibration we perform a set of policy experiments. We show that
the gains from pure risk-sharing (i.e. absent UI reforms) are very limited but that sub-
stantial welfare gains can be achieved by reforming the existing UI systems within Eu-
ropean countries. Even if, as we document, labour markets are very dierent, almost
surprisingly the (parameterised) UI systems that maximise welfare are very similar: un-
employment benets duration should be unlimited and replacement rates more similar
across countries than what they are now. We show that unemployment benet reforms
in some European countries aect the citizens of other countries through general equi-
librium eects which result from a common capital market. In particular, the decline in
precautionary savings associated with more generous unemployment benet systems
causes a reduction in the aggregate, European, capital stock. is in turn causes a de-
cline in wages all over Europe. is means that reforms which may seem optimal at the
national level can be detrimental at the European level once general equilibrium eects
are taken into account.
Finally, we show that a common, less generous, European benet system can tackle
this problem. We nd that a harmonized benet system with an unlimited duration
and a replacement rate of 15% is welfare improving in all countries, when it is nanced
by country specic contribution payments. e welfare gains are relatively large for
all countries, and almost unanimous within countries, even without accounting for the
risk-sharing gains that countries would have if, in addition to agents’ idiosyncratic risk
we also had aggregate country risks. at is, we required that each country runs a
balanced budget, thereby eliminating permanent cross-country transfers. With country
risks and no aggregate European risk, at the steady-state constant – but dierential –
taxes would also provide risk-sharing, with short-run cross-country transfers across the
EUIS, possibly with the support of a centralized fund as we discussed in the Introduction.
Even with European aggregate risk the EUIS would play a major stabilising role: taxes
would not be constant, unless the fund has borrowing capacity (which it should), but
still provide risk-sharing across countries and agents. In any case, the resulting tax
dierences across countries reect their structural labour market dierences, in terms
of job creation and destruction. ese tax dierences also provide clear incentives for
labour market reforms.
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In sum, by increasing welfare across European citizens the proposed EUIS can also be
an important cohesive EU institution. ere is no need to wait for European labour mar-
kets to converge to implement the EUIS. In fact, it can promote national labour market
reforms and European labour market integration.
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A Appendix
A.1 Transition Function
e transition function T it ((a, z, x);A×Z×X ) describes the probability that an agent,
who is in state (a, z, x) in period t, is in any state {(a′, z′, x′) : a′ ∈ A, z′ ∈ Z, x′ ∈ X}
in period t+ 1. is function is quite involved as it captures exogenous shocks and en-
dogenous decisions of the agent. Next period’s assets a′(a, z, x) are purely endogenous
as they are chosen from the agent in period t and not subject to any shock. Next pe-
riod’s productivity level z′ is purely exogenous and depends on the Markov transition
probabilities. Next period’s employment state x′ ∈ {e, ue, un, n} depends on a combina-
tion of exogenous shocks (job separation, job nding) and endogenous decisions (work,
search), which in turn depend on assets and individual productivity.
We can write the transition function as
Tt((a, z, x);A×Z ×X ) =
1ait+1(a,z,x)∈A ·
∑
z′∈Z
p(z′|z)
{
1e∈X · xe
(
ait+1(a, z, x), z
′)+ 1ue∈X · xue(ait+1(a, z, x), z′)+
1un∈X · xun
(
ait+1(a, z, x), z
′)+ 1n∈X · xn(ait+1(a, z, x), z′)},
where xe
(
ait+1(a, z, x), z
′) describes the probability of moving from labor market state
x ∈ {e, ue, un, n} into employment, conditional on saving ait+1(a, z, x) and on drawing
productivity shock z′. Similarly, xue(.) is the conditional probability of moving into
unemployment and being eligible for benets, and so on.
It is useful to dene the decision to search for a job next period, conditional on being
not eligible for unemployment benets by
st+1(a
′, z′, 0) =

1 if arg max
x′∈{un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′) = un
0 else

and the decision to search for a job conditional on being eligible for unemployment
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benets by
s(t+1a
′, z′, 1) =

1 if arg max
x′∈{ue,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′) = ue
0 else

Similarly, dene the decision to work next period, conditional on being not eligible
for unemployment benets by
wt+1(a
′, z′, 0) =

1 if arg max
x′∈{,e,un,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′) = e
0 else

and the decision to work conditional on being eligible for unemployment benets by
wt+1(a
′, z′, 1) =

1 if arg max
x′∈{,e,ue,n}
V it+1(a
′, z′, x′) = e
0 else

e conditional transition probability from employment into employment is then
given by
ee
(
ait+1(a, z, x), z
′) = (1− σi)wit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 0) + σiλiuwit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 1).
ere are two possibilities how an agent, who is employed in period t, is also em-
ployed in t+1: (i) the agent does not get separated, which happens with probability 1−σi
and does not quit his job, which is the case if the work decisionwit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 0) =
1. Since job quiers are not eligible for benets the last entry of the work decision is
zero; (ii) the agent gets separated from his job (with probability σi) but immediately nds
a new job (with probability λiu) and decides to work. In case of exogenous separation the
agent would be eligible for unemployment benets, therefore the last entry in the work
decision is equal to one. One can observe that this conditional probability is a mixture
of exogenous probabilities and endogenous decisions.
Similarly, we can dene the other conditional probabilities: e probability of mov-
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ing from employment to unemployment and being eligible for benets is
eue
(
ait+1(a, z, x), z
′) = σisit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 1)[(1− λiu) + λiu(1− wit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 1))].
Eligibility next period requires that the worker is exogenously separated, which hap-
pens with probability σi and that the agent is actively searching for a job, i.e. sit+1(.) = 1.
ere are again two possibilities to be unemployed next period: (i) With probability
1− λiu the agent does not immediately nd a new job (ii) with probability λiu the agent
immediately nds a new job but he decides not to accept the oer (wit(.) = 0).
e conditional probability of moving from employment into unemployment and
being eligible for benets is equal to the probability of not being separated (once you
are separated you are automatically eligible for benets), given that the agent decides to
quit w(.) = 0 and to search for a new job s(.) = 1:
eun
(
ait+1(a, z, x), z
′) = (1− σi)(1− wit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 0))sit+1(a′(a, z, e), z′, 0).
Finally, the conditional probability of moving from employment into inactivity is
given by
eun
(
ait+1(a, z, x), z
′) = (1− σi)(1− wit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 0))(1− sit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 0))+
σi
(
1− λiu + λiu
(
1− wit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 1)
))(
1− sit+1(ait+1(a, z, e), z′, 1)
)
.
e agent can become inactive either if he does not get exogenously separated but de-
cides to quit working and searching (st line) or if he gets separated and does not search
for a new job (second line).
We now described all possibly cases for an agent who is employed in period t, i.e.
xt = e. In an analogous way this can be done for all other initial labor market states, i.e.
for xt ∈ {ue, un, n}.
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